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In the information technology industries there are
several instances of a division of labour between
research companies and manufacturers, who apply
the researcher's know how in production. Firms
use several different ways to organise the decision
making and transfer of know how. The paper
compares a market transaction, where know how is
sold for a license fee, to two modes of
cooperation: a merger and an R&D alliance.
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11. Introduction
New developments in information technology (IT) give rise to a spate of alliances and mergers. It
is clear to observers that these are related to technological developments. For example, the
emergence of interactive television has inspired numerous alliances, e.g., Business Week (7-6-93, p.
56-7) mentions six of them. Interactive television also provided a rationale for the acquisition
battle around Paramount, which Viacom eventually won in 1994 for $10 billion. Mergers and
alliances may combine rivals (by a horizontal merger or alliance) or supplier and buyers (in a
vertical merger or alliance).
A special, and interesting, case of a vertical merger or alliance occurs when research
companies cooperate with manufacturing firms. The former supply an input (know how) to the
latter. In many examples, an upstart firm develops a new technology that large firms subsequently
take into production and commercialise. The upstart company EO Corp developed a personal
digital assistant cum telephone, and depended on AT&T for additional resources. To this end,
AT&T acquired EO Corp. The upstart firm 3DO designed an operating system for multimedia
machines. It licenses the operating system to manufacturers of the machines, such as Panasonic,
and to suppliers of software, such as Electronic Arts (for 3 dollar per unit of software sold, hence
the name). Several large companies that cooperate with 3DO have acquired a stake in it, such as
Time Warner, Matsushita, AT&T, and Electronic Arts. The innovator can also be an established
firm, whose innovation applies to a new market. For example, Apple developed a personal digital
assistant, the Newton, and relies on Sharp for manufacturing the machine, that competes with
Sharp's version of the Newton in the market place. There is cooperation and competition, therefore.
These examples raise the question: how should a downstream firm (that manufactures
hardware or software) relate to the (upstream) researchers who provide know how? They may
relate by means of contracts in the market for know how. That is, each manufacturer buys the best
technology available, at any moment in time. In the setting of 3DO, for example, nothing prevents
manufacturers from switching from its operating system to someone else's. They have no
commitment (if they are not among 3DO's owners). All risk of technology ventures (such as 3DO)
lie with the innovating company itself (and its owners). The manufacturers may increase their
commitment by cooperating with the innovator. Cooperation can take two forms: they may form
an alliance, or they may merge. In the latter case, the firm combines the R&D and production
processes. In the multimedia market, for example, Sony and Philips are competitors to 3DO. The
former two develop their own operating systems (the PlayStation and CD-i, respectively), produce
their own hardware and develop (some) of their software. To get that far, they acquired several
companies. Sony motivated its acquisition of Columbia Pictures with reference to synergy with
new electronic hardware (The Economist, 30-5-1992, p. 73). Alliances are a halfway house,
providing more commitment than a market contract, but less so than a merger. The alliance above
between Apple and Sharp is an example. Both bring in resources, and thus are to some extent
committed to making their Newton work (for consumers as well). These examples suggest that
market (licensing) contracts, mergers, and alliances can all be optimal ways of organising the
transfer of know how.
On the theoretical side, D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) have a seminal paper about the
2effects of competition, a merger, and an R&D alliance. They study a horizontal merger or alliance,
where there are two firms in the market, and each does R&D. The firms may coordinate their
R&D decisions, while continuing their independent R&D process (an R&D alliance), or they may
coordinate both their R&D and their output decisions (a merger). In the latter case, the market
becomes a monopoly. There are technical reasons for cooperating in R&D, as each firm's R&D
leaks to the other firm (has a positive spillover effect). There are also strategic reasons, as R&D
affects marginal costs and thus one's competitive position relative to the competitor. Firms may
also compete in R&D and in output levels. In a simple setting (constant returns to scale in
production, a linear demand curve, and complete information), they show that the merger induces a
higher R&D level than the alliance, and the alliance a higher R&D level than competition. The
effect of this on the product market is that the alliance induces a higher aggregate output level
than competition, which in turn induces a higher output level than the merger. De Bondt and
Veugelers (1991, p. 358) add that the merger has a higher profit level than the alliance. This paper
explores the results for the case of a vertical alliance between a research company and two
manufacturing firms.
The papers about horizontal merger and alliances assume that the advantage of a merger is
that it reduces competition in the product market. The social advantage of an alliance is that the
participants continue to compete in the product market. Another oft noted advantage of an alliance
is that it is a more flexible arrangement than a merger. Flexibility is an advantage if there is
uncertainty. Firms appreciate some freedom to react to new information that resolves the
uncertainty. To this end, the paper introduces uncertainty in the model. Firms do not want to
commit to an innovator (e.g., by merging with him), if there is some chance that another
technology emerges.
The IT examples all raise the question: how should the researcher and its manufacturing
clients coordinate their decisions? The next sections compare a market contract to cooperation, i.e.,
a merger or alliance, between an innovator and two downstream (manufacturing) firms. It finds
that cooperation stimulates aggregate output levels more than a market contract. But the market
contract may (if R&D is relatively costly) be more profitable. It also finds that an alliance
disappoints: it is usually less profitable than the other two forms, and always does less R&D.
2. The Model
The product market is a Cournot duopoly with two manufacturing firms, F1 and F2. Their products
are homogeneous and the inverse demand function is
(1) P(q1+q2) = a-b(q1+q2) (a, b > 0).
Marginal costs are ci for firm i (= 1, 2) (constant returns to scale). In the Cournot equilibrium, the
output levels are:
(2)
The second order conditions hold for substitute products (0 < b). The industry output is
3(3) Q = 
The Cournot duopoly profits are:
(4)
Initially, the marginal production costs are c, which expresses the current technology T0 (for
technology). An innovator, R1, develops an innovation, T1, that may reduce the production cost, c,
by an amount x (to c-x) at an R&D outlay: RD = (γ/2)x2 (D'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988).
The parameter γ indicates the costliness of R&D: the lower γ the more technologically dynamic
the market will be. The model explores two time periods. The R&D project starts at t = 0. At t =
1, the innovator R1 introduces its innovation. The market exhibits technological uncertainty: at a
probability ρ, another innovation, T2, arrives that reduces the incumbent firms' marginal costs to c`
(< c).2 The (successful) innovation by T2 is the only source of uncertainty in the market. The
expressions when ρ > 0 can be quite complicated. The main text gives the outcome when ρ = 0,
and the appendices give the results for the more general case (where 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1).
For reasons that become transparent later on, it is useful to make some simplifying
assumptions on a/c and γb:
(5) 2 < a/c.
(6)  a/c < γb.
These two assumptions combined imply that 4/3 < γb. Furthermore:
(7) (7/9)a/c-5/9 ≤ γb.
The game sequence is as follows. In the first period, the innovator and the manufacturing
firms choose a way to organize the transfer of know how. Given a particular organisation, the
innovator R1 decides about its R&D (x). At the beginning of the next period, T2 does or does not
arrive into the market. Observing this, the innovator R1 introduces its innovation. It announces a
license fee or uses another mechanism to transfer its know how to the manufacturing firms. Given
the arrival of T2, the innovation T1, and the license fee or other arrangement, the manufacturing
firms adopt a technology. The technology chosen and the way the innovator and the manufacturing
firms organize the transfer of know how, determine the firms' actual marginal costs (ci,cj). Given
these costs, the firms compete in the product market. (Technically, this is a four-stage game).
The results that we are interested in are the level of R&D effort (x), the expected (at t = 0)
aggregate output level (Q) of the two manufacturing firms, and the expected joint profit (ΠJ) of the
                                                       
2. The marginal cost c` may include an exogenous license fee. Alternatively, T2 may be an
improvement of T0 (e.g., by learning).
4three firms (at the beginning of the game, t = 0). The next sections study three ways in which R1,
F1, and F2 may organise their R&D: a market transfer or contract, a merger between the innovator
and a manufacturing firm, and an alliance among the innovator and both manufacturing firms.
3. The Market Transaction
In the market transaction the manufacturing firms wait until the innovation is introduced in the
market. They compare the offer by the innovator (that consists of an innovation and a license fee)
with the competing technology T2, if it arrived, and the existing technology T0. They adopt the
technology that offers the lowest marginal costs. The innovator R1 thus carries the entire risk of its
innovation. The manufacturers 'buy' technology in the market place whenever it comes available
(in the second period of the game).
In the first period of the game, the innovator chooses its R&D level, x, that reduces the
marginal production cost to c-x. In the second period it offers the new technology to the users with
a (per unit) license fee, l. The users F1 and F2 have marginal costs of c-x+l if they use T1. They
adopt T1 if the associated marginal cost is less than c (of T0) and c` (of T2, if it arrives).
Equations (2) and (4) give their output levels and profits, respectively. In the beginning of the
second period, the innovator observes whether T2 entered the market, and then decides on its unit
license fee, l. Anticipating this in the first period, the innovator chooses the R&D effort that
maximizes its expected profits:
(8) ΠR1 = δl(q1+q2)-(γ/2)x2;
where the discount rate δ = 1/(1+r). For convenience, assume that r = 0 and δ = 1.
3.1. The Second Period
The innovator faces one of three cases when choosing its license fee. Case 1 occurs if T2 does not
appear. In this case, R1 chooses the profit maximizing license fee that just deters firms 1 and 2
from staying with their existing technology: c-x+l ≤ c, i.e.., l ≤ x. If T2 does enter the market, R1
may try to undercut its offer (c`) if c-x < c`. This is case 2, where we shall call the rival's
innovation non-drastic. The innovator R1 can demand a license fee 'just' below c`: c-x+l ≤ c`, i.e.,
l ≤ x+c`-c. Case 3 holds if instead, c-x ≥ c`. The rival innovator leapfrogs the innovator R1, and
firms 1 and 2 switch to T2. Firm R1's license fee is zero. Call the rival innovation drastic.
The optimal license fee is:
x, for all 0 ≤ x < c in case 1 (T2 does not arrive);
(9) l = x+c`-c, if c-c` < x ≤ c (case 2, T2 arrives and is non-drastic);
0, if 0 ≤ x ≤ c-c` (case 3, T2 arrives and is drastic).
(Proof: see appendix A). As figure 1 illustrates, the licensee fee is everywhere larger if T2 does
not arrive than if it does. The license fee raises the marginal costs of the manufacturing firms to
their next best alternative (which is either c or c`):
5c, if T2 does not arrive (case 1);
Figure 1
(10) ci = 
c`, if T2 does arrive (cases 2 and 3).
The manufacturing firms' output and profit levels follow
from substituting equation (10) in equations (2) and (4),
respectively. The innovator's (R1) innovation has no
effect at all on the marginal costs, due to R1's license
policy. The license revenue of the innovator is:
2x(a-c)/3b (case 1);
(11) L = 2(x+c`-c)(a-c`)/3b, if c-c` < x < c (case 2);
0, if x ≤ c-c` (case 3).
3.2. The First Period
Given the expected license revenues, the innovator chooses its R&D strategy in the first period. Its
overall profit, ΠcR1, equals δE(L)-RD, where RD = (γ/2)x2, and δ = 1, for convenience. The
subscripts c, m, and a will refer to the market contract, merger, and alliance, respectively. At t = 0,
the expected license revenue depends on the outcome in the second period if T2 does not arrive
(case 1) and if T2 does arrive (case 2, if c-c` < x < c, and case 3, if 0 ≤ x ≤ c-c`). That is,
Πc(1) = , if 0 ≤ x ≤ c-c` (if T2 arrives, it is drastic) and
(12) ΠcR1 = 
Πc(2) = , if c-c` < x < c (if T2 arrives it is non-
drastic).
This function is continuous in x, but not continuously differentiable. We are now ready for some
results. The text of the paper reports the results for the special case where ρ = 0, i.e., the rival
technology, T2, does not arrive; see appendix B for the general case.
3.3. Results for the market contract
In the first period, the innovator chooses the profit maximizing R&D effort, x, subject to the
constraints 0 ≤ x < c:
(13) xc* =
The second order condition holds if γ > 0. Substitute equation (13) into equation (12) for the
6innovator's optimal expected profits at t = 0:
(14) ΠcR1* = 
Due to equation (10), the aggregate output level by the manufacturing firms, Q, does not depend
on the innovator's R&D. From equation (3) follows:
(15) Qc* = 2(a-c)/3b.
The profits of firms 1 and 2, Πi, are (a-c)2/9b (equation 4). Add their profits to ΠcR1* in equation
(14) for the expected (at t = 0) joint profit, ΠcJ*:
(16) ΠcJ* = 
In this section, the manufacturing firms have a non-committal attitude to the innovation. They shop
for technologies. In the next two sections, the manufacturers tie themselves to the innovator in the
first period, before the innovation is concluded and before the uncertainty about T2 is resolved.
The firms share some commitment, therefore. There are two instruments to do so: a merger with
the innovator, or an alliance. The next section explores the merger.
4. A Vertical Merger
Firms R1 and F1 (say) merge.3 After its merger, R1 may license the innovation to F2, while F2
can also choose T0 and the alternative innovation T2 (if available). The merged manufacturer, F1,
also still has the freedom to switch to T2, if available. The model shows why the merger,
notwithstanding this freedom of F1, does enlarge the manufacturing firm's commitment to T1. This
larger commitment in turn may give the innovator (in the merged firm) a larger incentive to
innovate, to the advantage of one or both manufacturing firms.
4.1. The Second Period
In this period, the merged firm chooses a license fee to firm F2 (l), and both manufacturing firms
then choose output levels. As before, there are three cases: T2 does not arrive (case 1), T2 does
arrive, and is non-drastic (c-x < c`, case 2), and T2 arrives and is drastic (c` < c-x, case 3). The
marginal cost of firm F1, c1, equals c-x or c`, whichever is lower. Notwithstanding its merger with
R1, the manufacturing division, F1, is free to switch from T1 to T2. The merger does reduce the
marginal cost associated with the innovation T1 from c-x+l (in the market transaction) to c-x (in
                                                       
3. An alternative model might be where R1 merges with F1 and F2. It seems likely that antitrust
would step in the way of this development. I thus ignore it.
7the merger). By reducing the marginal cost associated with T1, the merger raises the commitment
of F1 to T1. Because of this effect, the merger may have different dynamic outcomes than the
market contract. It follows that
c-x (in cases 1 and 2); and
(17) c1 =
c` (in case 3).
The marginal cost of firm 2, c2, equals min{c-x+l,c}, if T2 does not arrive, and c2 = min{c-x+l,c`},
if T2 does arrive. If c-x < c` (case 2), the innovator can choose a license fee that induces firm 2 to
use T1 rather than T2:
c-x+l, where l ≤ x (in case 1);
(18) c2 = c-x+l, where l ≤ x+c`-c (case 2);
c` (in case 3).
The merged firm's gross profit is (p-c1)q1+lq2. Substitute equation (17) and (18) in equation (2) for
the output levels:
(a-c+x+l)/3b (in cases 1 and 2); and
(19a) q1 =
(a-c`)/3b (in case 3).
(a-c+x-2l)/3b (in cases 1 and 2); and
(19b) q2 =
(a-c`)/3b (in case 3).
Due to equation (18), the upper bound on l is x, if T2 does not arrive, and x+c`-c, if T2 does
arrive (and is non-drastic, i.e., c` ≥ c-x). Call the upper bound k. Anticipating this, the merged firm
chooses l for cases 1 and 2 in the following Kuhn-Tucker problem:
(20) Maxl Π1 = , subject to k ≥ l and l ≥ 0.
This gives the same results as equation (9). The table gives the results for the three cases:
8Case 1
(No T2)
Case 2
(T2, c-c` < x ≤ c)
Case 3
(T2, 0 < x ≤ c-c`)
l = k x x+c`-c (-)
c1 c-x c-x c`
c2 c c` c`
q1 (a-c+2x)/3b (a-2c+c`+2x)/3b (a-c`)/3b
q2 (a-c-x)/3b (a+c-2c`-x)/3b (a-c`)/3b
Q [2(a-c)+x]/3b [2a-c-c`+x]/3b 2(a-c`)/3b
Π1 [(a-c)2+7(a-c)x+x2]/9b [(a-c)2+7(a-c)x-5(a-c)(c-c`)+x2+5x(c
-c`)-5(c-c`)2]/9b
(a-c`)2/9b
Π2 (a-c-x)2/9b [a+c-2c`-x]2/9b (a-c`)2/9b
This concludes the second period.
4.2. The First Period
In the first period, firm 1 chooses its R&D effort, x. The expected profits of the merged firm are
(for ρ = 0, see appendix C for the general case):
(21) Πm1 = 
4.3. Results for the merger
In the first period, the merged firm chooses the optimal R&D effort:
(22) xm* = 
The second order condition holds if 2-9γb < 0, which follows from equations (5) and (6). The
marginal cost, c-xm, is positive for all ρ if and only if a/c ≤ (9γb+5)/7, which accords with
equation (7). Substitute equation (22) in (21) for the maximum expected profit levels attained by
the merged firm:
(23) Πm1* = 
9The expected aggregate output level at t = 0, Qm, equals (see the table above):
(24) Qm = [2(a-c)+x]/3b.
Substitute the appropriate levels of R&D effort, from equation (22), in equation (24):
(25) Qm* = 
To find the expected joint profit of all three firms, we first identify the expected profit of firm 2.
In similar fashion as with Qm, this gives:
(26) Πm2 =
Substitute the appropriate levels of R&D effort, from equation (22), in equation (26):
(27) Πm2* = 
Add the expected profit of firm 2 to the expected profit of the merged firm for the expected joint
profit at t = 0 for all three firms:
(28) ΠmJ* = 
5. An R&D Alliance
The third cooperation arrangement in this paper is the R&D alliance. The alliance chooses the
R&D level that maximizes the joint profits of the three firms (R1, F1 and F2). The manufacturing
firms then compete with each other in the product market (at marginal costs of c-x, if they adopt
the alliance's innovation). Like the merger, this represents some commitment by the manufacturing
firms, as they participate in the alliance before the results of the innovation are there, and before
uncertainty about T2 is resolved. Like in the previous case, the manufacturing firms are free to
adopt T2 if this is profitable for them.4
An alliance is, of course, based on a contract that specifies behaviour or incentives. The
induced behaviour of the partners may or may not maximize their joint interest. A bargaining
process will distribute the aggregate profits over the three firms. Following other papers (e.g.,
                                                       
4. It follows that an alliance between the innovator and one manufacturing firm would be identical
to the merger. This is why the paper ignores that possibility.
10
D'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988), neither the contract nor the bargaining is specified, that is,
joint profit maximization is postulated rather than proven. The model is, therefore, not
descriptively correct, but its predictions provide the upper bound to what an alliance, with a
specified contract, might achieve.5
Firms F1 and F2 compete in the product market with identical marginal costs:
c-x, if T2 does not arrive (case 1) or if a non-drastic T2 arrives (case 2, c-c` ≤ x ≤ c);
(29) ci =
c`, if a drastic T2 arrives (case 3, 0 ≤ x < c-c`).
The gross profits are:
 (case 1 and case 2);
(30) Πi =
 (case 3).
The joint profit of the three firms in the alliance is:
ΠaJ(1) = , if 0 ≤ x < c-c` (cases 1 and 3);
(31) ΠaJ =
ΠaJ(2) = , if c-c` ≤ x ≤ c (cases 1 and 2).
As before, this is continuous, and quadratic in x. The results are as follows.
5.1. The results of the alliance
In the first period, the alliance chooses the joint profit maximizing level of R&D effort. Maximize
equation (31) for ρ = 0:
                                                       
5. Since the foundation of the alliance is a contract, one should ideally demonstrate that a contract
exists that induces these effects. If the contract specifies a license fee, results might be more akin
to the market contract. Unlike in a market contract, however, in an alliance the manufacturing
firms may acquire an interest in the innovator. Both firms may own the innovator (i.e., R1 is a
research joint venture of F1 and F2). In that case, the license fee is also a source of profits to
them. This would transform part of the license fees into a marginal revenue rather than a cost.
Hence, the firms' marginal costs would fall from c-x+l (market contract) down to c-x (alliance in
the paper). The case in this paper, where firms' marginal costs are equal to c-x, is thus an 'ideal'
case, that firms may reach by a combination of license fees and shares in the innovator. I leave
this to another paper.
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(32) xa* = 
The R&D level is positive, and the second order condition holds, as 9γb-4 > 0 (from equations 5
and 6). The associated maximum joint profit is
(33) ΠaJ* = 
(See appendix D). Positive R&D and output levels imply the assumption that (4/9)(a/c) ≤ γb,
which holds due to equation (6).
Due to equation (29), c1 = c2 = c-x, if ρ = 0 (see appendix D for the case when T2 may enter
the market, i.e., when 0 < ρ). This implies that
(36) Qa = 
Substitute the R&D effort level from equation (32) in the output level Q:
(37) Qa * = 
This completes the computations for the three modes of organising R&D. I will now compare their
outcomes.
6. Comparing the Market, Merger, and Alliance
In this section we look at the marginal costs, the R&D effort levels, the aggregate output level,
and the joint profit level of the three firms.
6.1. The marginal cost levels
First compare the pair of marginal costs (c1, c2) in the second period (with endogenous license fee,
l, and a given R&D effort x). See the table.
Case 1
(No T2)
Case 2
(Non-drastic T2: c-x < c`)
Case 3
(Drastic T2: c` < c-x)
Market (c,c) (c`,c`) (c`,c`)
Merger (c-x,c) (c-x,c`) (c`,c`)
Alliance (c-x,c-x) (c-x,c-x) (c`,c`)
This comparison shows that there is no difference if a drastic T2 arrives. Note that the cooperation
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form has an effect on x, and thus determines whether a particular c` is 'drastic'. In case 1, the
market has the highest marginal costs for both firms (as c > c-x). The alliance has the lowest
marginal costs for both firms. The merger is an intermediate case: it has the lowest marginal cost
for firm 1 but the highest marginal cost for firm 2. The same holds for case 2 (where c-x < c`).
The merger is efficient, compared to the market, as it chooses the output level of firm F1 on
the basis of the marginal production cost, c-x, rather than on the markup, l, that the innovator
imposes on top of the marginal production cost, c-x. This is the standard (double marginalization)
explanation of the efficiency of a vertical merger. That the merged firm raises the marginal cost of
firm F2 to the highest level acceptable (c, in case 1, and c` in case 2) is an example of a price
squeeze (Salinger, 1988). The merged firm supplies an input to F2 (know how) while competing
with it in the product market (through F1). Thus it raises the input price to F2 (the license fee) to
the maximum that it can extract. The alliance is even more efficient than the merger by the same
argument, as it succeeds in reducing the marginal costs of both firms to the marginal production
cost.
6.2. The R&D effort
Compare equations (13), (22), and (32) to find:
Proposition 1 (Optimal R&D effort levels): xa < xc < xm.
This result also holds in the case of technological uncertainty (proof: see appendix F). The result
about the alliance may be a surprise, as an alliance is usually presented as a way to stimulate
R&D. The European joint R&D programmes were started on this assumption. However, as Martin
(1993, p. 376) notes, R&D joint ventures are socially advantageous not because they encourage
R&D but because they encourage firms to compete in the use of new technology after it is
discovered. So let's turn to the effects on the aggregate output level (and by implication, the
market price).
6.3. The aggregate output level
The expected (at t = 0) output levels of the market contract, merger and alliance (Qc, Qm, Qa) in
equations (20), (30) and (37), when compared give:
Proposition 2 (Optimal aggregate output levels): Qc < Qm < Qa.
(Proof: see appendix G). Numerical simulations show that in all cases (including positive ρ's), it
holds that Qc < Qm. It is obvious that the aggregate output level of the market contract is the
smallest. In that case, the innovator imposes a license fee upon the manufacturing firms such that
their marginal cost does not fall. Hence, the R&D does not induce them to increase their output
level. The two modes of R&D cooperation do reduce the firms' marginal cost levels, and thus raise
their aggregate output level. If there is a positive probability that T2 does arrive (0 < ρ), then
cases exist where Qm > Qa. These are cases with intermediate values of c` (in between 0 and c),
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where there is technological uncertainty and the rival technology is a moderate improvement over
the current technology. Since the cumulative output level determines the market price, the merger
can be advantageous for consumers.
6.4. The joint profit level6
Compare the expected joint profit level of all three firms of the three modes of cooperation, ΠcJ*,
ΠmJ*, and ΠaJ* (when ρ = 0):
Proposition 3 (Joint profit levels): ΠaJ* < ΠmJ* and ΠaJ* < ΠcJ*.
(See appendix H). Thus, collectively, the three firms can improve upon an alliance by a bilateral
merger or by a market contract. Which of the latter is the more profitable depends on the
expression γb:
Proposition 4 (Joint profit level of merger and market contract): If 1  < γb < 20/27+(28/135)√10)
(≈ 1.397), then the merger is more profitable (ΠcJ* < ΠmJ*). For larger values of γb, the
market contract is more profitable.
(See appendix H). The lower bound to γb (1 ) follows from equation (6) and 2 < a/c. The
parameter γ indicates the costliness of R&D. Hence, in a dynamic environment (low γ), the firms
benefit from a merger. In a less dynamic environment (higher γ), market contracts are collectively
more profitable. If uncertainty is allowed (0 < ρ), appendix H finds that the merger is 'usually'
more profitable than the alliance.
The table reports a simulation where ac (= a-c) = 1, b = 1, and ρ = 0.5. The simulation runs
several values of dc (= c-c`)
and γ. Since c` < c, it holds
that 0 < dc. From 2 < a/c
follows c < a-c. Since dc <
c, it follows that dc < ac (=
1). Equations (5) and (6)
imply that 1.333 < γ (for b =
1). The left column shows
the values of dc simulated,
from 0.01 to 0.99. The top
row shows the values of γ
simulated, from 1.343 to
2.343. A '0' in the table refers
                                                       
6. The reason for focusing on the joint profit level is that the choice between market contract,
merger, and alliance involves all three firms. Their bargaining may achieve the outcome that
realizes the highest joint profits (the Coase theorem). Share prices (here implicit) and license fees
can be the instruments in this bargaining.
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to the situation where ΠaJ* = ΠmJ*, a '1' refers to ΠaJ* > ΠmJ*, and a '2' to ΠaJ* < ΠmJ*. The '2's in the
table show the preference for the merger. An alliance has a higher joint profit for intermediate
values of dc (and thus intermediate values of c` between 0 and c). For higher values of γ, the
value of dc for which the alliance is more profitable decreases. These are cases where the rival's
innovation is drastic for the alliance and non-drastic for the merger: c-xm* < c` < c-xa*. The merger
does more R&D than the alliance, and so much so that it hurts the profits of firm F2 (the price
squeeze) and thereby reduces the joint profits. Alliances thus emerge only if there is some
uncertainty (for otherwise proposition 3 holds), and if the alternative technology is neither very
efficient (c` low, dc high) nor a marginal improvement (where c` is close to c, and dc is close to
zero). The association of alliances with technological uncertainty seems an intuitive result.
7. Appraisal
This paper finds some clear-cut results when firms buy technology in the market or, alternatively,
cooperate with a research company. Cooperation is better than a market transaction in that a
merger gives a higher R&D outlay than a market contract, and both the merger and the alliance
give higher output levels than the market. Because of the latter, cooperation reduces prices relative
to the market contract, and thus benefits consumers. The market contract may, however, give rise
to the largest cumulative profits of the three firms. Although beneficial to consumers, therefore,
cooperation may not emerge.
Proposition 4 gives the intuitive result that if markets become more dynamic (in that the
effectiveness of doing R&D increases or its costliness decreases), then market contracts may give
way to mergers. This gives a meaningful explanation of why new developments in information
technology, such as multimedia and interactive television, induce a spate of mergers and
acquisitions. A new technological phenomenon, the digitization process, has turned the media into
fundamentally more technologically dynamic markets. Hollywood and Silicon Valley are about to
converge (into Sillywood, as insiders believe). This process underlies mergers, as insiders claim
and this model substantiates.
Proposition 3 has the result that an alliance is less profitable than the alternatives (if there is
no technological uncertainty). This is rather unexpected. Judging by the cumulative profits,
therefore, firms will never form an alliance, and either merge or conclude a market contract. The
analysis in D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) also led to the conclusion that a merger is more
profitable than an R&D alliance. The merger is more profitable than the alliance because it
increases market power by creating a monopoly. In this paper, the merger and alliance are vertical,
between downstream manufacturers and an upstream research company. The product market is not
monopolised. Nevertheless, in an indirect way, the merger creates market power too. The merger
creates an asymmetry between the marginal cost of the acquired manufacturing firm (whose
marginal cost falls from c to c-x) and the non-acquired firm (whose marginal cost remains at c, as
the license fee absorbs the cost reduction by the innovation). The cost asymmetry creates an
asymmetry in output levels that raises the concentration in the market and thus, indirectly, creates
market power. The aggregate profits increase as a result. For example, of the innovation reduces
the marginal cost of the acquired firm to a point where its monopoly price equals the other firm's
marginal cost (c), then the acquired firm has become a monopolist.
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If there is technological uncertainty, the alliance may be more profitable than the merger.
This confirms the intuition that an alliance is a flexible instrument that firms use in uncertain
environments.
16
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Appendix A: The market contract
Proof of equations (9) to (11).
Cases 1 and 2. The manufacturing firms will use the innovator's technology if T2 does not arrive
(case 1) or if, when it arrives, it is non-drastic (case 2). In both cases, the innovator faces an upper
bound on its license fee: l ≤ k, where k = x in case 1, and where k = x+c`-c in case 2. The
marginal cost is c-x+l, firms' output levels are (a-(c-x+l))/3b, and the aggregate license revenue is
2l(a-(c-x+l))/3b. The firm thus faces the maximization problem: choose a license fee l that
maximizes 2l(a-(c-x+l))/3b, subject to the constraint that 0 ≤ l ≤ k. Solving this problem with the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions gives
k, if k ≤ (a-c+x)/2
(A.1) l =
(a-c+x)/2, if k > (a-c+x)/2.
Apply this solution to cases 1 and 2.
Case 1. If T2 does not arrive, where k = x, then l equals x, if x ≤ (a-c+x)/2, i.e., x ≤ a-c.
Otherwise, l equals (a-c+x)/2, if x > a-c. Note that, of course, x < c. If 2c < a, then it is impossible
that a-c < x < c. Hence, for convenience we now only explore this particular case, which explains
the salience of assumption (5). Hence,
(A.2) Licensing if no T2 arrives: l = x, for all 0 ≤ x < c (case 1).
The marginal costs are c-x+x = c, and the output levels are (a-c)/3b. The license revenue follows:
(A.3) L = 2x(a-c)/3b (case 1).
Case 2. If T2 does arrive, and is non-drastic (c-x < c` or c-c` < x), then k in equation (A.1) equals
x+c`-c. It follows that
x+c`-c, if k = x+c`-c ≤ (a-c+x)/2, that is, if x ≤ a-2c`+c; and
(A.4) l =
(a-c+x)/2, if a-2c`+c < x.
Note that since c`< c and 2c < a, it follows that 2c` < a. Hence, it holds that x < c < a-2c`+c.
Thus, the case where x > a-2c`+c does not emerge. It follows that
(A.5) l = x+c`-c, for all x allowed (case 2, c-c` < x < c)
The marginal costs, c-x+l, are equal to c`. Thus c` imposes a binding constraint on the license fee:
the rival's technology has a real effect, even though neither firm chooses T2. Substitute this in
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equation (2) for the output levels. Thus,
(A.6) L = 2(x+c`-c)(a-c`)/3b, if c-c` < x < c.
Case 3. If T2 arrives, and is drastic (x ≤ c-c`), then the license fee is zero, and marginal costs are
c`. The license revenues, L, are also zero. This concludes the proof.
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Appendix B: The market transaction, the first period of the game
In the first period, the innovator chooses the profit maximizing R&D effort, x, subject to the
constraints 0 ≤ x < c. Straightforward but extremely tedious computations reveal that:
xc
(1)
 = , where x ≤ c-c`, if 0 ≤ c` ≤ c`c;
(B.1) xc* =
xc
(2)
 = , where c-c` < x < c, if c`c < c` ≤ c.
The subscript c refers to the market contract. The asterisk refers to optimal outcomes. The
threshold for c`, c`c, equals . The two solutions for x are the interior optima for Π1
and Π2 in equation (12), respectively. It is intuitive that when ρ = 0, the innovator's profit equals
2x(a-c)/3b-(γ/2)x2, and the profit maximizing R&D effort is 2(a-c)/3γb (independent of c`, of
course). If c' falls below the threshold (c`c), the innovator cuts back on its R&D effort (from 2(a-
c+ρ(c-c`))/3γb to 2(1-ρ)(a-c)/3γb), which is an intuitive result.7 Observe that for high c` ( c`c < c`
≤ c), a lower c` stimulates R1's R&D effort: a kind of leapfrogging. Substitute equation (B.1) into
equation (12) for the innovator's optimal expected profits at t = 0:
ΠcR1*(1) = (where x < c-c`), if 0 ≤ c` < c`c;
(B.2) ΠcR1* =
ΠcR1*(2) = (where c-c` < x < c), if c`c ≤ c` < c.
It follows that ∂ΠR1/∂c` = 0, for small c`, and ∂ΠR1/∂c` > 0, for large c`. This is an intuitive result:
for small enough c`, the innovator exclusively banks on the possibility that T2 does not emerge at
all. For larger c`, the innovator will license its technology even if T2 emerges. Since c` now
determines the size of the license fee, it influences the R&D incentives. It is also obvious why
∂ΠR1/∂ρ < 0 for all c`< c.
Due to equation (10), the aggregate output level by the manufacturing firms, Q, does not
depend on the innovator's R&D. With symmetric marginal costs, c1, the aggregate output level
equals Q = 2(a-c1)/3b (equation 3). In case 1, this equals 2(a-c)/3b, and in cases 2 and 3, this
equals 2(a-c`)/3b. Hence the expected aggregate output level at t = 0, Qc*, is:
                                                       
7. Note that the associated marginal cost, c-xc*, should be positive for all possible ρ and all
possible c`(including c` = 0). Since xc(2) ≤ 2(a-c+(c-c`))/3γb = 2(a-c`))/3γb ≤ 2a/3γb, it holds that
c-xc
(2)
 ≥ c-2a/3γb, and c-2a/3γb ≥ 0 if γb >  a/c, which accounts for assumption (6). Hence,
assumption (6) guarantees positive levels of marginal costs.
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(B.3) Qc* = 2[a-(ρc`+(1-ρ)c)]/3b.
The expected profits of firms 1 and 2, Πi, are ρ(a-c`)2/9b+(1-ρ)(a-c)2/9b (which follows from
equations 4 and 10). Add their profits to ΠcR1* in equation (B.2), to get the expected (at t = 0) joint
profit, ΠcJ*:
(B.4) ΠcJ* = 2A/9b, where A equals: 
(1-ρ)2(a-c)2/γb+2ρ(a-c)(c-c`)+ρ(c-c`)2+(a-c)2, where x < c-c`, if 0 ≤ c` < c`c;
A =
(a-c+ρ(c-c`))2/γb-ρ(a-c)(c-c`)-2ρ(c-c`)2+(a-c)2, where c-c` < x < c, if c`c ≤ c` < c.
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Appendix C: The expected profit of the merged firm:
Π(1) = ρ(a-c`)2/9b+(1-ρ)[(a-c)2+7(a-c)x+x2]/9b-(γ/2)x2, if 0 < x ≤ c-c` (cases 1 and 3);
(C.1) Π1 =
Π(2) =ρ[(a-c)2+7(a-c)x-5(a-c)(c-c`)+x2+5x(c-c`)-5(c-c`)2]/9b+(1-ρ)[(a-c)2+7(a-c)x+x2]/9b-
(γ/2)x2, if c-c` < x ≤ c (cases 1 and 2).
The two functions Π(1) and Π(2) are quadratic in the R&D effort, x. The function Π1 is continuous
but not continuously differentiable (at x = c-c`). Choose the R&D levels that are the interior
solution to Π(1) and Π(2):
xm
*(1)
 = , if 0 ≤ c` < c`m; and
(C.2) xm* =
xm
*(2)
 = , if c`m < c`≤ c.8
The second order conditions hold for -2+9γb > 0 and -2+2ρ+9γb > 0, which follow from 4/3 <
γb. For low values of c` (0 ≤ c` < c`m), the merged firm chooses a small R&D effort, such that 0
< x ≤ c-c`: if T2 comes, it is drastic, and replaces the innovation T1. If c` is high (c`m < c`≤ c),
the firm chooses a high R&D effort (c-c` < x ≤ c), such that if T2 comes neither firm uses it, but
it does depress the license fee that the innovator may ask (c` always imposes a binding constraint
on l: l = x+c`-c). The optimal expected profit of the merged firm is:
Πm1*(1), if 0 < x ≤ c-c` (cases 1 and 3);
(C.3) Πm1* =
Πm1*(2), if c-c` < x ≤ c (cases 1 and 2);
where Πm1*(i) = A(i)(a-c)2+B(i)(a-c)(c-c`)+C(i)(c-c`)2. It holds that
A(1) = 
B(1) = 
C(1) = 
                                                       
8. The threshold value for c`, c`m, is a root of Π(2)* -Π(1)* = 0 (there is another root that exceeds a).
This root is an expression too long to be reproduced here. In the special case where ρ = 0, c`m =
(9γbc+5c-7a)/(9γb-2).
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A(2) = 
B(2) = -
C(2) = -
The aggregate industry output equals:
Qm*(1) = , if 0 ≤ c` < c`m (cases 1 and 3); and
(C.4) Qm* =
Qm*(2) = , if c`m < c`≤ c (cases 1 and 2).
Substitute the R&D levels for the optimal aggregate expected output level, Qm*:
Qm*(1), if 0 ≤ c` < c`m; and
(C.5) Qm* =
Qm*(2), if c`m < c`≤ c;
where Qm*(i) = A(i)(a-c)+B(i)(c-c`). It holds that:
A(1) = 
B(1) = 
A(2) = 
B(2) = 
The expected profit (at t = 0) of firm 2 is:
Π2*(1) = , if 0 ≤ c` < c`m (cases 1 and 3); and
(C.6) Π2* =
Π2*(2) = , if c`m < c`≤ c (cases 1 and 2).
Substitute the optimal R&D levels in equation (C.6), and add the result to the profit of the merged
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firm, in equation (C.3) for the expected joint profit of the three firms:
ΠmJ*(1), if 0 ≤ c` < c`m; and
(C.7) ΠmJ* =
ΠmJ*(2), if c`m < c`≤ c;
where ΠmJ*(i) = A(i)(a-c)2+B(i)(a-c)(c-c`)+C(i)(c-c`)2. It holds that
A(1) = 
B(1) = 
C(1) = 
A(2) = 
B(2) = 
C(2) = -
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Appendix D: the alliance.
The (interior) optima for x from equation (31) are:
xa
*(1)
 = , if 0 ≤ c` ≤ c`a (where 0 ≤ x ≤ c-c`); and
(D.1) xa* =
xa
*(2)
 = , if c`a < c` ≤ c (where c-c`< x ≤ c).
Some tedious computations show that c`a = a-9γb(a-c)/[√(9γb-4)√(9γb-4+4ρ)]. For ρ = 0, the
optimal R&D level coincides with xa*(2), which obviously maximizes the associated profit in
equation (31) when ρ = 0. The second order condition holds if -4+4ρ+9γb > 0 and -4+9γb > 0,
which follows from ρ > 0 and 4/3 < γb. Substitute (D.1) in equation (31) for the optimal,
expected, aggregate profit of the alliance:
ΠaJ*(1), if 0 ≤ c` < c`m; and
(D.2) ΠaJ* =
ΠaJ*(2), if c`m < c`≤ c;
where ΠaJ*(i) = A(i)(a-c)2+B(i)(a-c)(c-c`)+C(i)(c-c`)2. It holds that
A(1) = 
B(1) = 
C(1) = 
A(2) = 
B(2) = 0; and C(2) = 0.
To compute the aggregate output level, observe from equation (29) that c1= c2. The output levels
are (a-c1)/3b (equation 2), and the aggregate output level, Q, is 2(a-c1)/3b. Due to equation (29), Q
equals 2(a-c+x)/3b in cases 1 and 2, and 2(a-c`)/3b, in case 3. The size of the R&D effort, which
in turn depends on c`, determines whether case 2 or 3 occurs if T2 arrives. That is,
Qa*(1) = , where x = , if 0 ≤ c` ≤ c`a (where 0 ≤ x
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≤ c-c`); and
(D.3) Qa* =
Qa*(2) = , where x = , if c`a < c` ≤ c (where c-c`< x ≤ c).
The expected aggregate output level is:
Qa*(1)  = A(a-c)+B(c-c`), if 0 ≤ c` ≤ c`a, and
(D.4) Qa* =
Qa*(2) = , if c`a < c` ≤ c;
where
A = 
B = .
26
Appendix E: Comparing the market, the merger and the alliance
In the first period, the levels of x chosen depend on critical values of c`, called c`c in the market),
c`m (in the merger), and c`a (alliance). Numerical simulations show for relevant parameters a, b, c,
and γ (where equations 5 - 7 hold) and for ρ from 0 to 1, that 0 < c`m < c`c < c`a < c. In the
special case where ρ equals zero, the threshold values for c` are such that:
(E.1) c-c`a = 4(a-c)/(9γb-4);
(E.2) c`a-c`c =  (a-c)(3γb-4)/((9γb-4)γb);
(E.3) c`c-c`m =  (a-c)(3γb+4)/((9γb-2)γb);
(E.4) c`m-0 = (9γbc+5c-7a)/(9γb-2).
These expressions are all positive, which confirms for ρ = 0 that 0 < c`m < c`c < c`a < c. This
gives four intervals for comparing the first period outcomes: the interval [0,c`m], [c`m,c`c], [c`c,c`a],
and [c`a,c]. 
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Appendix F: Comparing the R&D levels
Interval 1: 0 < c` ≤ c`m. The R&D effort levels chosen are in the top rows of equations B.1, C.2
and D.1. Computations show that:
(F.1) xa xc ...2
3
( )ρ 1 ( )a c ( )
..3 γ b 4 .4 ρ
( ).( )4 .4 ρ ..9 γ b ( ).γ b
This expression is negative as ρ < 1, a-c > 0, 3γb-4+4ρ ≥ 3γb-4 > 0, due to equation (6).
Equation (6) also implies that 9γb-4+4ρ ≥ 9γb-4 > 0. Hence, xa < xc (and equality if ρ = 1).
(F.2) xm xc ...1
3
( )ρ 1 ( )a c ( )
..3 γ b 4 .4 ρ
( ).( )2 .2 ρ ..9 γ b ( ).γ b
This expression is positive as ρ < 1 and 9γb-2+2ρ ≥ 9γb-2 > 0. Hence, xc < xm and equality if ρ
= 1. Conclusion: xa ≤ xc ≤ xm.
Interval 2: c`m < c` ≤ c`c. The R&D effort levels chosen are in the top row of equation (13), the
bottom row of equation (22), and the top row of equation (32). The formulas for xc and xa do not
change, and it immediately follows that still xa < xc. The result for the merger is:
(F.3) xm xc .1
3
( )....3 γ b ρ ac ....15 γ b ρ ac2 ...3 γ b ac .4 ac ..4 ρ ac
( ).( )2 ..9 γ b ( ).γ b
Here, ac stands for a-c and ac2 stands for a-c`. This expression is positive, hence, xc < xm.
Conclusion: xa < xc < xm.
Interval 3: c`c < c` ≤ c`a.
The appropriate formulas for x are in the bottom rows of equation B.1 and C.2 and in the top row
of equation D.1:
(F.4) xm xc .1
3
( )....3 ρ dc γ b ...3 γ b ac .4 ac ..4 ρ dc
..( )2 ..9 γ b γ b
Read: ac = a-c and dc = c-c`. The expression is positive as ac-ρdc ≥ ac-dc = a-2c+c` ≥ a-2c > 0.
(F.5) xc xa ..2
3
( )4 .4 ρ ..3 γ b ...6 γ b ρ
..γ b ( )4 .4 ρ ..9 γ b
ac ..
2
3
ρ dc
.γ b
The expression is positive as 3γb-4 > 0 and dc > 0. Conclusion: again xa < xc < xm.
Interval 4: c`a < c` ≤ c.
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The appropriate formulas for x are in the bottom row in the equations B.1, C.2 and D.1. The
formulas for xm and xc are the same as in interval 3, hence its conclusion applies here as well.
(F.6) xc xa .2
3
( ).4 ac ...3 γ b ac ..4 ρ dc ....9 ρ dc γ b
..γ b ( )4 ..9 γ b
This expression is positive as 3γb-4 > 0 and 9γb-4 > 0. Hence, xa < xc. The conclusion remains:
xa < xc < xm. To sum up: the four cases show xa ≤ xc ≤ xm and xa < xc < xm if ρ < 1. QED
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Appendix G: Comparing the aggregate output levels
I give the analytical results for the special case where ρ = 0, and simulation outcomes for ρ > 0.
The same intervals on c` exist as in appendix F. In comparing the aggregate output levels, note
that Qc from equation (B.3) holds for all intervals. As for the merger, Qm*(1) holds in interval 1 and
Qm*(2) holds in intervals 2, 3 and 4 (see equation C.5). As for the alliance, Qa*(1)  holds in intervals
1, 2 and 3, and Qa*(2) holds in interval 4 (see equation D.4).
Interval 1: 0 < c` ≤ c`m. Compare Qc*, Qm*(1) and Qa*(1) . It holds that:
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a
( )1 Q
m
( )1
..ac ( )1 ρ 2
.4 ρ ..3 γ b 4
..( )4 .4 ρ ..9 γ b b ( )2 .2 ρ ..9 γ b
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(G.2) .Q
m
( )1 Q
c
..
7
3
( )1 ρ 2 ac
.( )2 .2 ρ ..9 γ b b
Both expressions are positive.
Interval 2: c`m < c` ≤ c`c. Compare Qc*, Qm*(2) and Qa*(1) . For the special case where ρ = 0, it holds
that:
(G.3) Q
a
( )1 Q
m
( )2
.( )..3 γ b 4 ac
..( )4 ..9 γ b b ( )2 ..9 γ b
This is positive, hence Qa*(1) > Qm*(2).  Simulations for ρ = 1 show that the opposite holds. Cases do
exist, therefore, where a merger entails a larger aggregate output level than the alliance.
Interval 3: c`c < c` ≤ c`a.
Compare Qc*, Qm*(2) and Qa*(1) . The same results apply as in the previous interval.
Interval 4: c`a < c` ≤ c.
The special case where ρ = 0 has the outcome:
(G.4) Q
a
2 Q
m
2
.
( )..3 γ b 4
( ).( )4 ..9 γ b ( ).( )2 ..9 γ b b
ac
This is positive, hence Qa*(2) > Qm*(2) . If ρ exceeds zero, simulations show cases where the opposite
holds.
Intervals 2, 3 and 4: c`m < c` ≤ c.
Compute for these three intervals, for the special case where ρ = 0, the difference:
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(G.5) Q
m
2 Q
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This is positive. Simulations show cases where the same holds for ρ > 0. For the special case
where ρ = 0, this concludes the proof. QED
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Appendix H: Joint profit levels
Due to the complicated expressions if ρ is positive, I focus here on the case when ρ = 0, i.e.,
where we ignore T2.
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This expression is positive (as follows from equations 5 and 6).
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This expression is positive.
(H.3) pi
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J
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2 ..200 γ b ..135 γ 2 b2 16
..b2 ( )2 ..9 γ b 2 γ
This function has the opposite sign of S(γb), where S(x) = -200x+135x2+16. The roots of S(x) = 0
are x = 20/27-(28/135)√10) (≈ 0.08) and x = 20/27+(28/135)√10 (≈ 1.397). S(x) is negative in
between the roots and positive elsewhere. Hence, if 1.397 < γb, then S(γb) is positive, and the
expression in (H.3) is negative: the market contract is more profitable than the merger. QED
If ρ is positive, the same four intervals have to be studied as in appendices F and G. I focus now
on the merger and the alliance. Results are as follows.
Interval 1: 0 < c` ≤ c`m. Compare ΠmJ*(1) and ΠaJ*(1) . It holds that:
(H.4) ΠmJ*(1)-ΠaJ*(1) = 
This expression is positive for all ρ < 1, and zero for ρ = 1. If T2 comes with certainty, it is a
drastic innovation both in the case of the merger (as c` ≤ c`m) and in the alliance (as c` ≤ c`m <
c`a). In that case, neither the merger nor the alliance have an effect, and their R&D levels will
equal zero (see equations C.2 and D.1).
Intervals 2 and 3: c`m ≤ c` ≤ c`a. Simulate ΠmJ*(2)-ΠaJ*(1) . ΠmJ*(2)-ΠaJ*(1) is a function of the
parameters a, b, c, γ, ρ, and, for convenience of notation, dc (= c-c`) rather than c`. Note that
since c`m ≤ c` ≤ c`a, also c-c`m ≥ c-c` ≥ c-c`a. Define ccm as c-c`m, dc as c-c`, and cca as c-c`a,
with cca ≤ dc ≤ ccm. Both cca and ccm are functions of the parameters a, b, c, γ, and ρ (for c`a,
see equation D.1).
Table 1 presents some simulation results (each row only records changes relative to the
previous row). It is assumed that a = 1, b = 1, and c = 0.3. These results show that cases do exist
where the alliance is more profitable than the merger. These are cases where there is some
probability (or certainty) that T2 arrives in the market. Moreover, γ should not be too large, for
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then the sign of
Table III
γ ρ cca ccm Sign of ΠmJ*(2)-ΠaJ*(1) 
2.9 0.9 .067 .121 -
0.7 .079 .139 -
.5 .092 .158 + (dc = .1)
- (dc = .15)
3.3 .9 .058 .104 -
3.5 .054 .097 -
3.9 .048 .086 + (dc = .05)
- (dc = .075)
4.3 .043 .077 -
9.9 .018 .032 -
.5 .024 .043 -
4.9 .051 0.89 + (dc = .06)
- (dc = .075)
2.9 0.92 .158 + (dc = .105)
- (dc = .12; .135; .15)
2.3 .12 .206 + (dc = .135)
- (dc = .15; .165; .18;
.195)
1 .079 .147 + (dc = .08)
- (dc = .1; .12; .14)
Π m J * ( 2 ) - Π a J * ( 1 )
becomes negative.
Also, dc should be
'small', that is, c`
should be `large`
( w i t h i n t h e
interval c`m ≤ c` ≤
c`a). So if there is
( p r o b a b l e )
t e c h n o l o g i c a l
rivalry, the costs
of R&D are not
too high, and the
rival technology's
marginal costs are
not too low, then
an alliance can be
more profitable
for the three firms
jointly.
 Note that if
ρ = 1, T2 comes
with certainty, and
is drastic for the
alliance (as c` <
c`a), such that the
alliance does not
do any research
( s e e e q u a t i o n
D.1). The alliance's joint profits are the duopoly profits when marginal costs are c`, which is
identical to the joint profits of a merger if the merged firm would not commit any R&D. The
merger is less profitable than the alliance as its R&D increases the profits of the merged firm, but
reduces the profits of firm 2 (its marginal costs are c`, which the R&D does not change due to the
license policy of the merged firm, and the market price falls). Saying that the merger is less
profitable than the alliance (if ρ = 1) is thus tantamount to saying that R&D by the merged firm
reduces the joint profits (which, as simulations show, does indeed happen).
Interval 4: c`a < c` ≤ c.
The expression ΠmJ*(2)-ΠaJ*(2) is too long to be reproduced here. Simulations did not reveal any
instant where this expression is negative, so the results seems to be that the merger is more
profitable than the alliance.
To sum up, the merger is 'usually' more profitable than the alliance, with exceptions for
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intermediate values of c`, and low values of γ.
